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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: KEYNOTE ADDRESS OF
THE SECOND ANNUAL BARON DE HIRSCH MEYER
LECTURE SERIES*
THE HONORABLE HAROLD LEVENTHAL**

The lawyer's duty to the public is often referred to by the
multifarious term "Professional Responsibility." In his address
Judge Leventhal scrutinizes this term from a variety of perspectives. The examination includes a discussion of the means of
better serving the needs of the legal consumer througha consideration of the duty to provide competent counsel; the acceleration
of the appellate process, from notice to decision; an increase in
judicial activeness; a reexamination of confidentiality and of the
conflict of values between lawyer and client; and the need for
lawyers who would represent public interests.
Thank you very much, Dean Mentschikoff, and ladies and
gentlemen. My purpose today is to strike a keynote for discussions
on the lawyer's role in society. I understand that although this is the
second of this series of lectures, I am the first keynoter. When I was
sent a program and learned that our symphony had four movements, I, judging from the topics, speculated it was going to have
four different keys. I anticipate the series will have concord and
discord, harmony and cacophony, in the best traditions of classical
and modern music. I suppose there will be resolution on some
things, agreement on some things, and on others only an agreement
to disagree in the best tradition of international conferences. To this
effort, I am conscious that I bring a somewhat limited perspective
in terms of talking of roles of lawyers in society.
I am aware that I am still a residue of 30 years of lawyering; 10
within the government, 20 outside the government. I'm also aware
that for more than 10 years I have been removed from the cockpit,
and I think something may be gained, but a good deal is lost, when
your work takes you out of the turbulence of today and tomorrow.
Fortunately, the nature of our circuit, and the current of the law
today is such that judges are brought in early in certain conflict
* Judge Leventhal's remarks have been transcribed from a tape recording of his address.
There was no prepared text.
** United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
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resolution problems, by applications for injunctions, or declarations
for relief against injustice and against illegality. So perhaps I have
some observations which may be helpful to you in thinking about
these problems, or in listening to the others think about these problems.
I propose to set the stage, (you notice I've changed my metaphor now, it's not music it's drama) and I'm now thinking of it as a
play with four acts, and I will be the prologue. Later on you will have
moderators and they will be a combination of Greek chorus and
kibitzer. In my prologue, I intend to identify certain tensions that I
glimpse in many discussions of the lawyer's role in society.
Any discussion of the lawyer's role in society should examine
both the lawyer and society, and then their relation; that is a tautology but it is a true tautology. Sometimes, that is the beginning of
wisdom. The discussion of lawyers and what their responsibilities
are and what should be done, very frequently, becomes an elaborate
discussion of what I might call "insider" concern. As the arcane of
the cult and the guild, they lose some perspective on what the purpose is of having law and lawyers. Instead of having a field of vision
that is broad enough to keep the ends of justice in mind at all times,
even peripherally, you have a kind of tunnel vision that focuses on
the machinery of the administration of justice. Well, I am not here
to start off as a philosopher, or, in Karl Llewellyn's memorable
phrase, as a jurisprude.
As you will see in the course of your law school development,
there seem to be two schools of jurisprudence. The first consists of
those who think of adaptations of the social compact, Locke to
Rousseau and now to John Rawls. For those who have not been
exposed to John Rawls', "Theory of Justice", I commend it to you
for bedtime reading; it is the most soporific book I have ever read.
The other group are the pragmatists, and I suppose their philosophy can be summed up in that memorable phrase of Holmes, "The
life of the law is not logic, it is experience." Alexander Bickel had
prepared some articles and lectures, which have now been brought
out posthumously, in which he pays particular homage to Edmund
Burke as someone who works with society as it is, and who sees what
kind of adaptations can be made to keep people in fair approximation of living together and accommodating each other. Burke is
always derided as a conservative, but if one reads attentively, one
finds out he is quite aware of the need for change and the inevitability of change. The discussion is on the direction of change and the
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rate of it. As Roscoe Pound has put it, "The law is stable, but it does
not stand still." I suppose that if we have any faith in law, faith in
our Constitution, faith in our role in preserving them, it is a faith
that freedoms, fundamental rights, machinery and procedures for
adjustment of rights, however untidy they may become in any particular case or in the short run, operate in the long run to promote
fair accommodations among men and stability in society. Sophocles
in "The Song of Man" says this: "What is more wonderful than
man, who has mastered the art of speech, of mind's swift thought,
and of living together in neighborliness?"
The role of lawyers and law is to seek to reduce the conflicts of
brutal and savage nature by the use of civilized machinery, and that
apparatus can cope with conflicts only if it confronts them. If we
ignore them, if we subdue them, we are not really trying to serve the
purpose of law. You may have had assigned to you for reading Cardozo's great work, "The Paradoxes of Legal Science," written 50
years ago. It still identifies the great tensions of law: the conflicting
pulls of stability and continuity against the pull of change. How are
we lawyers organizing ourselves to help bring up and resolve these
conflicts, these tensions, in a way that makes society achieve its
great goals?
The subject of professional responsibility involves various tensions, some of which I propose to identify. I think the legal profession is a guild that is particularly rife with a sense of tension, contradiction, and ambivalence; both in our own aspirations, the way we
criticize ourselves and each other, what other societies expect of us,
and what the rest of society perceives that we have to give.
One of the realities of thinking about lawyers is that you can
find many expressions of distrust and even hatred of lawyers: a
feeling that they are overbearing, argumentative (which of course is
true), that they are deceitful in that they are self-motivated and
self-concentrating, and that they do not really serve the society,
always with conspicuous exceptions. With reference to Bartlett, you
will find quotations on this, from the Bible, "Woe on to you lawyers", to Shakespeare, "Let's kill the lawyers", and so on.
I was rather heartened recently on reading a preliminary report
of an American Bar Association survey on the legal needs of the
public. Solis put the question in a seminal article some years ago:
"What do we know about what legal needs are unmet? What do
people want lawyers for and are unable to have lawyers for? How
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much of a need is there for lawyers? Do people know what their own
needs for lawyers are?" The American Bar Association's survey
attempts to probe that question. If I discern anything from the
preliminary report it is that there are fewer occasions when people
really seem to need lawyers than you might have imagined from the
literature on the subject. But without getting into that at the moment, I was rather struck by responses which indicate a more favorable view of the legal profession than I had supposed existed in the
past in the public at large.
On the proposition "lawyers can be trusted by their clients," 49
percent agree strongly, and 33 percent agree, though less strongly,
let us say, slightly. That is a remarkable consensus. Of course, 10
or 12 per cent disagree, but the bulk feel that lawyers can be trusted.
On the proposition "lawyers do not try to understand their
clients," 46 percent disagree strongly; again, quite a remarkable
statistic. Similarly, there was a strong favorable consensus on propositions like these: lawyers try to understand what the client wants;
lawyers try hard to solve their client's problems without going to
court. On the question: "Could you get a fair trial if accused of a
crime?" 53 percent strongly agree. On the question: "Can lawyers
be trusted to keep their clients secrets?" 49 percent strongly agree.
There are, however, some negative aspects to this poll. There is a
feeling that many legal tasks could be done equally well bynonlawyers, less expensively, and there is much to that point. But I
must say that I felt very heartened by this wide perception in the
outside world that lawyers are performing a large part of the job of
professional responsibility, giving a feeling that there are people
here that laymen can trust, professionals who are interested in serving their clients rather than only themselves.
One of the major tensions I see in the law is this ambivalence
about whether we are a trade or a profession. Of course, what a
profession is, is itself a question which requires some definition. As
Shaw put it, "All professions are conspiracies against the laity."
There was a time when Alexander Wilcox gave a different twist. He
said that professions tend to get ruined by amateurs, though he was
dwelling primarily on the two oldest professions.
Roscoe Pound, in a more serious vein, provided another definition: "Historically, there are three ideas involved in a profession:
organization, learning, and a spirit of service. They are essential.
The remaining idea, that of gaining a livelihood is incidental." Well,
I am not sure that puts it right. I think gaining a livelihood is on
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equal footing with the others. But the others are there, not only
gaining a livelihood, but offering service, having a sense of selfesteem, of the worth and contribution of the service. Further, I think
there is always a mixture of motives bringing people into a profession. The large number and the high quality of people coming into
the law or coming into the law schools is some indication that we
do have a profession that has that large element in its make-up. But
we also are a trade in many respects and I think it was not reassuring, but rather stimulating, that the Supreme Court recently decided that the minimum bar fee schedules for title examinations
were a conspiracy in restraint of trade and a violation of the antitrust laws.
We are a trade that has thus far been organized according to
rules that prevent advertising. While practicing law, I was a member of our bar association's "ethics committee," and found myself
involved in consideration of such questions as whether lawyers who
were also accountants could put both professions on the door; what
they could put in announcements; how much they could put in their
announcements concerning their recent government connections,
and so forth. The traditional approaches resisted, it seems to me,
extending the knowledge of what services are available. The Consumer's Union through some public interest lawyers has brought a
law suit in Virginia to set aside or at least modify considerably that
Canon of Ethics. That suit is now in abeyance while the American
Bar Association conducts hearings to reconsider the question. Of
course there will be abuses in advertising. Self-vaunting and misleading advertising will, no doubt, be very hard to monitor. But the
question arises, whether we don't really help fulfill our role, at least
in some of the things that are done, by laying it on the line and
reassuring people that there are modest charges for modest tasks.
Lawyers can be consulted with set schedules and offerings known
in advance, without feeling you have to rob the bank to see them.
The Supreme Court has used the Constitution to strike down
some old shibboleths of legal ethics about practicing on behalf of
groups, as opposed to the old tradition that a lawyer is someone who
is approached in the first instance by his client. The Supreme Court
has held for example, that unions have a constitutional right to hire
a lawyer to render services to their members. It. is quite remarkable
to think that this relationship was put in the form of a fundamental
constitutional right. But when you get down to reading that opinion
in its details, the question is whether the state might want to pre-
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vent this type of situation in order to stop baseless litigation. Overriding that state interest was the interest of the union members in
having an efficient way of getting quality legal services at a reasonable cost.
I turn to the duty to guarantee competent counsel. Chief Justice Burger has been much concerned these past few years about the
low qualifications and capabilities of lawyers who appear in court,
stressing professionalism, stability of courtroom procedure, and
conduct in the courtroom. The Chief Judge of my court, Judge
Bazelon, has given some talks on this general subject and has used
colorful phrases charging that some of the lawyers who provide assistance are "walking violations of the sixth amendment."
A proposal arose in the second circuit, which the so-called Clary
Committee put forward, that is essentially a requirement of course
exposure. You cannot be a trial lawyer unless you have taken certain
courses. The theory is that lawyers must study evidence the same
way that doctors must study anatomy. The courses that have been
prescribed are all courses I think everybody should have, such as
criminal law, criminal procedure, civil procedure, evidence, and
professional responsibility. There is absolutely nothing wrong with
that. I think it is important that these things be under the belt of
everyone who is going to be a lawyer, because even though you do
not envision yourself as being a litigator, I do not think you can be
a good lawyer in anything that you do unless you have some sense
of what is involved in the possibility of litigation. You cannot be a
good negotiator unless you understand the risks and possibilities of
litigation. I do not think you can be a good draftsman unless you
can think in those terms. All the counseling that goes on in a law
office, it seems to me, would require some knowledge of what the
end of the game would look like.
What concerns me about these courses however, is that here
they are giving them to the people who are first coming on board as
trial court lawyers and the older lawyers are being grandfathered in.
It seems to me, if they are going to do that, they should take the
approach that the Minnesota court has taken, all lawyers go to
school and take courses, a kind of practicing legal institute. The
Minnesota bar was furious, although for the time being this is
apparently subdued, perhaps because the requirements are not
stringent. In any event, it seems to me that sometimes the young
lawyers coming on are more competent than the old war horses and
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if we are going to have courses, we ought to have them on a broader
scale.
We are on a new tack now in our circuit-the "DeCoster" rule.
It used to be that you could make a claim in a criminal trial of
ineffective assistance of counsel only if you could show a really
horrendous result had been reached. They used to say the trial had
to be a farce or a mockery in order to get constitutional relief. In one
of my early opinions, I subdued that by saying it did not have to be
a farce and it was enough if there was gross incompetence which
blotted out the essence of a substantial defense. However, it has
been carried now still further so that we actually look at whether
the appointed lawyer has prepared a case. Naturally, the court cannot track the details of what he has done, or review tactics. But
some questions can be asked. Did he consult with the client? You
would be surprised how many lawyers do that very skimpily, if at
all. Did he interview witnesses? Did he avail himself of services that
are available, investigative services and the like? It is only a beginning, but at least we are sensitive to the tension inherent in reviewing incompetence claims. Although we try to avoid second-guessing
lawyers, which I think would be very destructive, we are at least
permitting some kind of a view to what they have done to make sure
there has been minimum competency. In that regard, we do not
have to work on constitutional grounds necessarily because we will
take the case on appeal, when we have a broader review to avoid
injustice even if there are no constitutional violations. We will send
it back to the trial court to conduct evidentiary hearings on what
was done if something is called to our attention.
Another tension which our court must resolve concerns the appointment of appellate counsel. Some people say we should always
use the trial lawyer as the appellate lawyer, because it is efficient;
you get the records certified faster; you know sooner what questions
arise in the case; you do not have to have a transcript; it is faster,
cheaper, and more efficient; all of which are true. On the other
hand, a very experienced friend of mine says. "I always feel better
when they appoint someone else for the appeal when I have tried
the case. If I have missed something, I would like someone else to
take a second look at it, and never mind that it takes a little bit
longer to get into it. At least you have that double gate to go
through."
There are always complaints that the appellate process is too
slow. A large part of the appellate court delay is the time consumed
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before the case is argued. I was looking over our statistics recently.
Our circuit has a very poor record in terms of the median time of
disposing appeals. It is sometimes 11 months from the time the
appeal is filed until its disposition. But the median time from the
date of argument to the date of decision is less than 2 months. It is
the problem of certifying the record, the lawyers getting familiar
with the case, the briefs and so forth, before the case is set down,
which causes the delay.
Additional tensions are created by our adversary system of justice. In this system the assumption is that the truth will best be
obtained if the two sides are completely self-oriented and give their
own versions of the truth for the decision of the tribunal. In this
model, the judge has a passive role until the very end. All the action
is on the part of the lawyers. This leads to problems. We are getting
away from the pure adversary model in many respects that do not
involve the lawyers necessarily, or do so only impliedly. One of
them, for example, is the right of the judge to call witnesses or to
put questions to a witness, beyond those that are put by the lawyer.
We had discussion in one of the Watergate cases, the Liddy case,
in which Judge Sirica himself asked questions upon completion of
examination of a witness. Sloan testified he gave $200,000 to Liddy
and did not really know for what purpose the money was to be spent
because he was acting on the instructions of others. That was the
testimony as given. Judge Sirica called him for further examination
outside the presence of the jury, and asked him a number of questions, concerning just how the money was delivered, the laundering
of checks, the Mexican bank, the Miami bank, and so forth. The
point is that Judge Sirica did a lot of questioning on his own. Later
a question arose on that questioning because he permitted the transcript to be read before the jury. We had some problems about what
Judge Sirica had done. Fortunately, we did not have to worry about
them too much, because what Liddy's lawyer was saying was that
he had a right to make sure there were no further questions put to
this witness, who was very damaging to Liddy. The settled rule is
that the judge has some right to put questions himself, and to call
witnesses. This gets away from the adversary model. The adversary
model is thus not a complete model, but it is a large part of our
assumption.
Incidentally, the adversary model also is departed from on the
appellate level. One day, just about 2 years ago, I was sitting in my
chambers when a law clerk came in and said "There is an emer-
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gency." "What is the emergency?", I queried. He said that Judge
Sirica had just put John Lawrence, who was the manager of the
Washington Bureau of the Los Angeles Times, in the cell block
because he refused to produce a tape recording which the newspaper
had in its possession. The tape recorded an interview that a reporter, Jack Nelson, had with Alfred Baldwin, a former FBI agent
who worked for McCord at the Republican National Committee.
The morning after I signed the release I said to myself, I do not
understand this situation becoming a great constitutional case involving great issues - freedom of the press, freedom not to reveal
sources, unconstitutional intrusion into the press. Here is a man
who is going to give testimony. When he gives testimony, he could
certainly be impeached if he said anything different. The defendant
would be entitled to any interview that he gave for public newspaper
release. It is perfectly obvious the defense is going to be entitled to
that. So why would he object to this? Well, my law clerk said I was
silly, "Obviously there's a reason why they would object." To which
I replied, "I do not think there's a real case." I had the courage of
my convictions, and was rash enough to overrule my law clerk.
When the question of the newspaper's right to claim privilege came
up for argument I said to Mr. Biltman, who was arguing the case
for the defense, wanting access to the records: "Did you ask Mr.
Baldwin whether he had any objection to release of these tapes?"
(There is only an assertion if the source wants confidentiality.) He
said that he had not. He had just asked the newspaper because they
had the tapes. Well the next morning, I read in the newspaper that
following my question at conference, both Mr. Biltman for the defense, and Mr. Silbert for the prosecution put in calls to Mr. Baldwin's counsel. Sure enough, it turned out there was no objection to
the release of the tapes except for a small segment of a personal
nature, which could be stricken. So you see, by being an activist,
and not letting the issues get settled by the lawyers, but rather
defining them for myself, I had in effect departed from the adversary model at the appellate level.
In this adversary system, we have the assumption that on each
side, in each case, the client has the complete fidelity and undivided
allegiance of his lawyer. But there are some qualifications that are
being urged on that issue. The ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility and Disciplinary Rules state that the lawyer may reveal a
confidential communication in order to prevent a fraud on the tribunal. This, in plain English, means perjury by the client. This
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issue is posed in a book Dean Freedman of Hofstra has released this
year, which carries forward discussions which have been going on for
some years. Suppose the defendant tells the lawyer in advance of
trial what the facts are. Later he tells the lawyer that he proposes
to take the stand and give quite a different account. What is the
duty of the lawyer? On the one hand, there is a fraud, perjury of
course. However, if the lawyer violates the confidence, will people
have any faith in their lawyers from here on out? Now, the American
Bar Association has put out some standards in which they say it is
unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to lend aid to perjury, or the use
of perjured testimony. I think there may be more reason to let a
defendant give his story because he is on trial than to let a witness,
who is not on trial, give a perjured account. It presents different
questions. Although the Bar Association receded from its first stand,
it takes the position that if this happens, the counsel can do only
one thing. He can put his client on the stand, have him identified,
and then say: "Do you have a statement that you care to make?"
Then the defendant tells his own story. The theory of this program
is that the lawyer will not be lending his aid to this perjury by
eliciting the facts in narrative form, or by making sure that nothing
gets omitted. Dean Freedman raises the question that does trouble
me. Does not this really tell everybody, tell the judge, who certainly
knows about it, and tell juries who can come to know about it? Does
it not really tell them what happened in the lawyer's office because
he is treating the defendant differently from the way all other questioning at the trial has been conducted, and that difference communicates the signal that what the defendant is now saying, differs
from what the defendant said in the lawyer's office? This seems to
me to be a very serious problem, this divergence of pulls. You do
not want perjury in the court room and you do not want to breach
the confidential communications. It is what Freedman calls, the
"trilemma" that faces defense lawyers, because: (a) they have a
duty to learn all the facts; (b) they have a duty to keep it confidential; and (c) they have a duty to prevent perjury, which naturally
present inconsistencies.
This practice of a lawyer not telling the jury of his own personal
belief led to a conviction in a famous case. Judge Walter Hoffman,
District Judge in Virginia, now head of the Federal Judicial Center,
had a case in which it came out through the prosecution witnesses
that the defendant had murdered a fellow prisoner. That was clear,
but it came out through the prosecution witnesses, that the defen-
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dant had done so because he was provoked to repel unnatural sex
advances. This would have been at the very least provocation reducing the seriousness of the crime, and possibly might have led to &n
acquital. The defense lawyer, however, knew from statements made
to him by the defendant, that these alleged sexual advances were
not a fact, and so he did not ask any questions, he did not propose
any instructions, and he did not make any summation to the jury,
because he felt it would be unconscionable for him to do so. Judge
Hoffman ruled in that case that he was carrying his own personal
conscience too far, that he had in effect denied a fair trial to the
defendant, by denying him representation, and the judge set aside
the conviction. Well, you see these are hard issues.
I may say they took a poll in the District of Columbia and they
asked lawyers what they do in this situation, or what they would do,
I guess, with the defendant who was going to relate a different story.
90 percent of the people responding said they would put him on the
stand and ask questions. That practice in fact was different from
what the American Bar Association's standards require.
One of the abiding tensions in the practice of law arises from
the conflict between the lawyer's sense of his own values, and the
client's sense of values in the case. Some years ago, Ralph Nader
arranged a confrontation by some law students in the office of Lloyd
Cutler, one of our distinguished lawyers in Washington, to say that
Cutler's undertaking for General Motors a settlement of an antitrust suit in California which charged conspiracy in suppressing
anti-pollution devices, was a betrayal of the public interest. They
further suggested that the lawyer's own sense of values and of serving the public interest should have led Cutler to refuse to settle the
case. I may say, that was before Nader settled his own case against
GM. Now, Cutler challenged them. What right did they have, what
right would the lawyer have to put his own values above other values, the values of settlement, the values of appeal to the Justice
Department and to the Court? Is it a matter of arrogance to be doing
this? On the other hand, everybody has to live with himself.
Everybody has to decide his purpose in practicing law. What is he
here for? What does he want to do with his skills? And how is he to
make these adjustments?
In our system, we don't have the taxi-rank system of the British
bar. As you may know, British Barristers are not permitted to refuse
a brief that is tendered to them by a solicitor, assuming that the
cash is on hand. They work on the taxi, common carrier principle.
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Everybody has a right, and the next taxi up has to carry the passenger. We do not have that. We permit lawyers to refuse cases, to
refuse clients, and to withdraw from clients, assuming there is no
unfairness involved. And we work on the assumption, that when a
lawyer does take on a client or a case, he has to really do the best
he can, giving all of his professional skill to the interest valued by
that client. This does not mean that he does not have other things
to present to the client. I feel that the lawyer who does not give his
non-legal judgments to the client is not really serving him well. The
client is entitled to the total judgment of his lawyer on legal issues,
and on interrelated social or ethical policy issues. If I may adapt a
phrase, it is the kind of role that the chancellor has as the conscience
of the king. Naturally, the king will decide what is to be done, but
at least the chancellor gets the conscience points brought before the
king.
In today's society, the lawyer serves a very useful role in bringing to the client's attention what the rest of society is thinking, a
sort of larger perspective. That is a very useful thing, and I feel that
clients are often persuaded by their lawyers away from their first
inclination, and that a great deal of what goes on at the bar, really
a great deal of the law, is what the lawyers tell their clients. Their
frank discutsions often include non-legal, social implications. At the
end of the road, most lawyers, an overwhelming majority of lawyers,
would feel that once the matters have been presented, it is the
client's value judgment that should control and that the lawyer just
exercises professional responsibility. This is in the adversary model.
It assumes that there will be another side presented, so that you will
have the two adversaries conflicting.
But will the other side always be presented? A person who has
a great interest in putting chemicals on the market may have a very
large financial interest, and on the other side there is a diffused
interest among the mass of consumers. Now we have government
agencies to protect the public interest to some extent, though not
always, as some decisions are made in the private sector, without
government agency involvement. This whole question of public interest law gives rise to what Brandeis made a great point of in his
life - the people's lawyer. We have sort of a modern version of it
in Ralph Nader, with some differences in style and capability. Public interest law must be looked at as one of the things that comes
out of law school, out of lawyer training.
I look back on my own experience, and I find that some of the
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things which I did of a public nature really stay with me much more,
as both making my life interesting at the time, and as part of my
peak of memories now, than private cases that I won, although I do
remember them fondly too. I have blessedly, like most people, a
temptation to forget those that I lost. The whole question of what
public interest law does, how we can organize to do it, is really one
of the great issues of the profession today. A number of law firms
have some public interest departments under different names.
There are public interest law firms in Washington that have simply
done magnificent work in our court. They present cases for Consumer's Union, Wilderness Society, and Natural Resources Defense
Council. They bring things up. They bring another perspective to
the court that makes it possible to focus on issues with more than
the limited perspective that you get without them, thereby making
a very important contribution.
We do not know what is going to happen with that whole eruption in the law, because up to now it has been funded by foundations, and that tap is running dry and will be removed. Our court
tried to provide a system of attorney's fees in the Wilderness Society
case with a reasonably well-reasoned opinion. I did not write it, but
I certainly concurred in it, but the Supreme Court found the legislature had not permitted that.
We are in a system where we do not have attorney's fees except
with certain exceptions, and now there are legislative efforts to provide them. A recent statute gave the Federal Trade Commission an
amount, it is not a great sum, but it is not insubstantial either, to
use to pay public interest firms for representing public interest
groups that would not otherwise be represented, and for representing those that the commission itself could not necessarily represent.
Judge Burger, when he was on our court, wrote an opinion which
said that the listening public could be heard in opposition to the
extension of a radio and television license. But of course, the listening public does not have a monetary base or incentive to intervene
unless some way is found for providing that stimulus.
There are proposals for the bar to make funds available. Even
though in our individual cases we must be committed to our clients,
as a bar, we should have an obligation to support these public interest presentations. But, other people say, "No, if I am a member of
the bar, as I must be in some states, I don't want my money possibly
being used for causes I do not believe in." This is the other side of
that argument. The bar is reexamining itself, reexamining some of
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its ethics rules, and I hope will continue to reexamine them so that
what was originally set down for a litigation context is not necessarily applied to another, or what was originally set down for a profit
context is not applied to another. For example, you normally cannot
solicit clients, but in Washington there was a public interest law
firm, The Stern Fund, which was permitted to advertise for people
who were interested in adoptions. They were advancing the idea of
interracial adoptions which were much frowned upon by people handling adoptions in the government, and they wanted to crack that
attitude. Taking into account that it was a non-profit organization,
they were permitted to advertise for clients, in effect, which is
against the main rule of ethics. So there are little cracks in what the
bar is doing to resist some of these temptations. I do not know how
soon it will come to the idea of supporting them, much less supporting them with cash, but at least that is one of the questions that
has to be faced if we are asking ourselves: "Is the bar as a whole
doing what it should do to present the full public interest and the
full ends of justice for accommodation in society?" And I suppose I
will end on that note. I had a number of other things that occurred
to me, but my time and garrulousness have absorbed the material
that I can usefully present to you at this time. Some of the hard
questions today, are: What is the bar going to do as a whole? What
directions can it take as a whole to favor and further the idea of what
will be presented before Congress, before committees, before government agencies, before the courts, and in stockholders' meetings that
will present the many facets of the public interests? In our pluralist
society we rely on our faith that we will make right decisions, or if
we do not make them the first time around we will make them
eventually. But that depends upon whether the various interests
that make up our society have a voice-that voice hopefully, will be
in large part supplied by lawyers, but it can not be done on a gratuity basis, because that will be, in the long run, ineffective. Some way
has to be found to make it effective. As I say, that is one of the great
problems, one of the great issues facing the bar.

